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THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AS A MECHANISM
FOR REDISTRIBUTING INCOME: GOOD GOAL, BAD POLICY*
The judicially created warranty of habitability appears to
have been intended primarily as a means to alleviate poverty by
forcing landlords to better maintain low-rent housing units
under threat of legal sanctions. The Author argues, however,
that the warranty of habitability results in scarcer, more expen-
sive housing for the poor. Moreover, the quality of low-rent
housing is a consequence of inadequate demand due to the low
incomes of renters rather than an inadequate supply of housing
units. The Author proposes legislative alternatives to the war-
ranty of habitability as more effective means of helping the
poor.
IN A SERIES of District of Columbia cases, the following deter-
minations were made. First, a lease for residential property is
illegal and unenforceable when that property is in violation of the
local housing code, even if the tenant was on notice of the viola-
tions prior to signing the lease agreement.' Second, there exists an
implied warranty of habitability such that a tenant's obligation to
pay rent is suspended for the period of time during which viola-
tions of the housing code exist.2 Moreover, at the time of trial for
either breach of warranty or possession, if a breach of warranty is
found, the finder of fact determines the extent to which the rental
obligation is permanently reduced, if at all.3 Third, in order to
* The Author would thanks his wife, Rebecca, and his son, Halden, who made the
writing of this Note well worthwhile. The Author also thanks his advisor, Laura Brown
Chisolm, for her constructive criticism.
1. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968). In Brown, the violations
consisted of "an obstructed commode, a broken railing and insufficient ceiling height in the
basement .... Id. at 836. Since the tenant had vacated the premises, the court did not
decide the issue of whether and when the landlord could regain possession from the tenant
under an illegal lease. The court did have occasion to decide this issue in a later case,
Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969). It held that "the tenant
becomes a tenant at sufferance[,] and the tenancy, like any other tenancy at sufferance,
may be terminated on thirty days' notice." Id. at 495. See infra note 4 and accompanying
text.
2. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
3. Id. at 1082-83.
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regain possession of leased property from a tenant who has as-
serted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability as an af-
firmative defense for nonpayment of rent, the landlord must first
rebut a presumption of illicit retaliatory motivation.4
The purpose of this Note is twofold. The first is to distinguish
between two apparent goals of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.5 The second is to explain why the use of the warranty of hab-
itability to achieve one of these goals, the assurance of basic
health and safety standards, may be a justifiable public policy,
while its use to achieve the other goal, a redistribution of income
to alleviate poverty, effectively counters the public interest it is
meant to foster. This Note presents flaws in this judicially-created
incomes policy and offers alternatives that are consistent with the
goal of raising the quality of housing available to the poor.
I. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
The warranty of habitability is one component of a twenty to
thirty-year trend in residential tenant-landlord law intended to
heighten the protections afforded to tenants. The trend appears to
be due as much to legislative enactments and codifications as to
judicial application of contract and consumer law to residential
4. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("when the landlord's conduct is 'inherently destructive' of tenants' rights, the jury may
... presume that the landlord intended [to punish tenants or chill the exercise of their
rights]"). In this instance, the violations were:
large pieces of plaster . . . missing throughout the house . . . no step from the
front walk to the front porch. . .[a] shaky and unsafe [front porch] ...a wall
in the back bedroom which was not attached to the ceiling and which moved
back and forth when pressed . . . nails protrud[ing] along the side of the stair-
way ... a pane of glass missing from the living room window and ...the
window frame in the kitchen . . .[was] so far out of position that one could see
into the back yard through the space between it and the wall."
Id. at 858.
5. Javins is generally perceived as "the leading case establishing the implied war-
ranty of habitability." Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 522 (1984); see also Glendon, The
Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REV. 503, 525 (1982)
("Commentators have pointed out flaws in [the Javins Court's] reasoning and have ques-
tioned the soundness of some of [its] factual assumptions, but no one can doubt the
profound influence the Javins case has had on later implied warranty decisions." (footnotes
omitted)). Javins was not the first case to consider an implied warranty of habitability,
however. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ire-
land, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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leases.' At least one commentator has gone so far as to suggest
that the provision of residential rental housing in the United
States has taken on many aspects of a regulated public utility.'
But in contrast to the analogous-sounding implied warranty of
merchantability of the Uniform Commercial Code,8 the warranty
of habitability goes beyond an attempt to ensure that renters get
essentially what they bargained for. The term itself is a misnomer,
since the source of the landlord's duty to provide habitable prem-
ises emanates from public policy (generally in the form of the lo-
cal housing code9) rather than from any agreement between the
landlord and tenant.' 0
The implied warranty of habitability, as it has developed, is
not solely a mechanism to enforce the implied terms of a bar-
gained-for contract between the tenant and landlord, as is the
warranty of merchantability implied in a contract between the
buyer and seller of a good." At a minimum, the warranty of hab-
6. See Glendon, supra note 5, at 521-528.
7. See generally Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law - Are Landlords
Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 707 (1981) (discussing rent control and eviction control
as limitations on a landlord's freedom to contract). This theory has not escaped the judici-
ary. Nearly ten years earlier, Judge Robb, dissenting in Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972), stated that "[t]he theory of the majority seems
to be that if not an outlaw a landlord is at least a public utility, subject to regulation by the
court in conformity with its concept of public convenience and necessity."
8. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987).
9. E.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO. CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 361.02 (1986) ("the purpose
of this Code is to establish minimum standards necessary to make all dwelling structures
safe, sanitary, free from fire and health hazards and fit for human habitation and beneficial
to the public welfare"). But see, for example, Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 III. 2d 1, 471 N.E.2d
915 (1985), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that neither a building code nor a
housing code is required to enforce an implied warranty of habitability. Defects substantial
enough to render a dwelling uninhabitable to a person with reasonable sensitivities was
held to constitute a breach of the implied warranty. For a discussion of this case and the
court's holding, see Note, Expansion of Tenants' Rights and Remedies in Illinois: Glasoe
v. Trinkle and the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
273 (1987).
10. Rabin, supra note 5, at 523..Under this view, the so-called warranty is neither
waivable nor disclaimable, since it derives from public policy and not from an agreement
between the parties. Id.
11. See Glendon, supra note 5, at 547 ("the implied warranty of habitability in resi-
dential leases has small resemblance to implied warranties in the sale of goods"). If the
analogy to sales contracts were to hold, several conclusions would presumably follow:
The warranty of habitability would apply to any premises used or occupied
by human beings, whether for residential, commercial, or charitable purposes. In
addition, acceptance of premises clearly uninhabitable or assent by the tenant to
a lease provision describing the premises as conveyed "as is" would usually con-
stitute a waiver of the warranty. The landlord's duty under the warranty would
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itability additionally seeks to ensure that tenants reside in a dwell-
ing which meets basic housing health and safety standards.1 2 Pre-
sumably, modern consumers of rental housing have little
knowledge of the technicalities of building construction and main-
tenance requirements. 3 In an increasingly complex market society
where specialization is highly valued, there seems little reason to
expect an individual consumer to become apprised of every bit of
information that might possibly have an impact on the individual's
well-being. 14 It may therefore be reasonable and efficient for gov-
ernment 15 to set and enforce such technical standards 16 legisla-
be discharged by delivering and maintaining rental premises of "fair average
quality" fit for the ordinary purposes for which such premises are used. Ascer-
tainment of damages for breach would be designed to compensate for and gener-
ally would approximate the loss to the tenant of his bargain. Yet, a study of the
implied warranty cases and statutes suggests that none of these conclusions is
substantially correct.
Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L.
REV. 1, 13-14 (1976). The warranty of habitability generally applies only to residential
leases - not to commercial ones. Id. at 14.
12. Many courts following Javins are willing to find a breach of the warranty of
habitability only for defects that substantially threaten health and safety. An existing hous-
ing code is generally used as a standard of reference in determining whether there exists a
breach of the warranty, but courts do vary as to how closely the warranty follows the code.
See Abbott, supra note 11, at 17-20. Even when applied only to substantial defects, some
surprising results may occur.
Red Robinson, an 87-year-old Harlem landlord . . . has been sent to jail three
times - once for 30 days - for failing to supply heat to squatters in the
burned-out building he owns next door. "The judge strictly told me that regard-
less of who it is, I'm supposed to give them heat and hot water .. "
Lochhead, Protracted Rent Control War Takes Toll on Housing Stock, INSIGHT, Apr. 13,
1987, at 38.
13. "[T]oday's city dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to mainte-
nance work; he is unable to make repairs like the 'jack-of-all-trades' farmer who was the
common law's model of the lessee." Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
14. Economists refer to this as rational ignorance. When the expected benefit from
acquiring additional information is less than the expected additional cost, the economically
rational consumer chooses to be ignorant of the additional information. See R. BYRNS & G.
STONE, ECONOMics 433 (4th ed. 1989).
15. An argument could be made here that a prospective tenant could hire a private
contractor to assess the health and safety conditions of a potential residence and that such
an arrangement would likely be more efficient than a government bureaucracy. Such an
argument would have to consider the economies of scale involved in centralizing the inspec-
tion process in connection with the enforcement of housing standards. Unless the private
housing inspectors can directly bring about an enforcement of the minimum health and
safety standards, multiple private inspections will presumably be made as different prospec-
tive tenants consider the premises, or an additional inspection will have to be made by a
government inspector anyway. This also raises the issue of whether individuals could afford
to, or would even choose to, hire private inspectors on their own. If health and safety is a
[Vol. 40:525
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tively, through housing codes establishing minimum health and
safety criteria, and judicially, through an implied warranty of
habitability limited to ensuring that the substantial health and
safety requirements of the housing code are enforced and that
rental housing poses no significant threat to a tenant's health and
safety through latent defects. 17 If housing safety is a matter of
public policy, then legislatively mandating minimum health and
safety standards and judicially enforcing them are justifiable as an
appropriate, and seemingly noncontradictory, means toward that
end. Unless legislation is discriminatory under the interstate com-
merce clause, 8 violative of fundamental constitutional rights
under the due process clause, 9 or, in the case of state legislation,
violative of the supremacy clause,20 as long as the ends of the leg-
islation are in the public interest and the means chosen bear a
rational connection to those ends, the Supreme Court will show
substantial deference in upholding state or federal regulatory
legislation. 2'
public good (see infra note 25) that society chooses to make available to everyone, then
private inspections are inappropriate unless the fee is publicly paid. However, one must also
consider the reality of the responsiveness of a bureaucratic housing authority to individuals,
especially poor individuals, and the extent to which individuals avail themselves of such
government help. Furthermore, one must gauge how often the housing authority actually
inspects residential rental property and how frequently it follows through with enforcement
against violators.
16. And then again, it may not be reasonable and efficient for government to set and
enforce such standards. Government, too, may suffer from imperfect information and ra-
tional ignorance. See R. BYRNS & G. STONE, supra note 14, at 94. Government action may
also suffer from rent-seeking behavior, special interest effects, political shortsightedness,
and bureaucratic self-interest. See Gwartney & Wagner, The Public Choice Revolution,
23 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 17, 19-23 (Spring 1988).
17. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 520, who argues that the warranty of habitability
should only be used to enforce contract expectations.
[A]Ithough the warranty of habitability applied to latent defects promotes the
efficient provision of housing, the same warranty applied to patent defects
retards it. The key question is, Does the law reflect what the parties would have
bargained for with full knowledge and experience? To the extent that it does,
the law promotes the efficient provision of housing.
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with Indian
Tribes.").
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be. . . deprived of life liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
20. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution and Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land").
21. See generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, AND M. TUSHNET, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1-65, 115-212, 249-339, 691-751, 840-925 (1986) (Supreme Court reluctant
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A second goal underlying the warranty of habitability, how-
ever, goes beyond ensuring that rental housing poses no substan-
tial threat to the occupant's health and safety. The objective of
some courts in implying a warranty of habitability appears to be a
redistribution of income from landlords to tenants by attempting
to force landlords to offer higher quality housing at a lower rent
than determined solely by market forces. 2
One obvious way to help the poor, at least in the short run, is
to redistribute some of the income generated by society directly
from its wealthier to its poorer members, either as cash or in-kind
payments.23 Redistributing income to the poor is perceived by
many as an appropriate function of government.24 Although the
redistribution of income would seem to be a task better suited to
the legislative and administrative branches of government,25 the
to invalidate state or federal regulatory legislation unless the legislation interferes with
either the Commerce Clause or fundamental individual rights).
22. "When code enforcement is seriously pursued, market forces generally prevent
landlords from passing on their increased costs through rent increases. . . . But it is un-
doubtedly true that the same landlords would be able to make a greater profit if the hous-
ing code were enforced laxly or not at all." Robinson v. Diamond House Corp., 463 F.2d
853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation omitted).
23. These "transfer strategies" include such income transfer programs as social se-
curity, aid to families with dependent children, food stamps and unemployment insurance.
See E. DOLAN & D. LINDSEY, MICROECONOMICS 383-386 (5th ed. 1988). "Examples of in-
kind transfers are food, medical care, and housing. In-kind transfers may be effected by
distributing 'vouchers' that can be used to purchase only specified commodities. ... T.
POGUE & L. SGONTZ, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION To PUB-
LIC FINANCE 131 (1978). Other suggested methods of helping the poor include creating
greater economic opportunities for the poor (through anti-discrimination laws, education,
and otherwise) and encouraging general economic growth, see, e.g., P. SAMUELSON & W.
NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICs 458-464 (1989), and targeting impoverished areas for eco-
nomic development, see, e.g., Shapiro, A Conservative War on Poverty, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Feb. 27, 1989, at 20-23.
24. See J. BUCHANAN & M. FLOWERS, THE PUBLIC FINANCES: AN INTRODUCTORY
TEXTBOOK 86 (4th ed. 1975).
25. Courts themselves may affect the distribution of income in the course of deciding
a case, especially when providing a remedy. However, this consequential redistribution,
typically involving a small number of parties and resulting from fairly well-defined legal
principles applied to the case at hand, needs to be distinguished from a judicial goal of
income redistribution. The redistribution of income and wealth with the goal of reducing
poverty has the characteristics of a quasi-public good. Id. A pure public good "(1) cannot
be provided for one person without also being provided for others and (2) once provided for
one person can be provided for others at zero added cost." E. DOLAN & D. LINDSEY, supra
note 23, at I ll. The benefits to society from reducing poverty by redistributing income
seem to satisfy the criteria for a quasi-public good. See J. BUCHANAN & M. FLOWERS,
supra note 24, at 31-32, 86. Impure,
or 'quasi' public goods, are supplied by the state and financed out of taxation
because it is considered that their quality and/or quantity of supply would be
[Vol. 40:525
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judicial approach of imposing a warranty of habitability to attain
this goal might be justified (if not constitutionally,26 at least by
those favoring judicial activism in social policy formulation) as the
court unilaterally taking what action it could to reduce perceived
inequities in the distribution of income and wealth, were it not for
two factors. First, many landlords are only "slightly more afflu-
ent" than their tenants.2 There even appears to be a current trend
towards small-scale ownership of residential rental property. 8
"[M]ore than 80 percent of New York's rental market is owned
by small landlords, and 64 percent of those are just breaking even
or losing money."29 The warranty of habitability is clearly not a
"means tested" redistribution program, since a tenant's income
and wealth are not factors determining whether the tenant quali-
fies for its benefits. 30 On the contrary, it seems the primary benefi-
ciaries of indirect housing assistance, such as housing codes and
inadequate under private provision. Since, however, the extent to which a good is
a public good is .. .a matter of degree, there is room for genuine political
debate about the appropriate means of provision.
G. BANNOCK, R. BAXTER, & R. REES, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 336
(1972) [hereinafter G. BANNOCK]. Matters to be resolved by political debate, such as the
appropriate provision of public goods, typically have been matters for legislatures rather
than courts to decide. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 207 (1819), held that:
[W]here the [legislation] is not prohibited [by the constitution], and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted [sic] to the government, to un-
dertake . . . to inquire into the decree of its necessity, would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.
This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.
26. In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a
tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease
without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant
agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing
and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial
functions.
27. Glendon, supra, note 5, at 563. "In Boston, for example, the landlord is apt to be
a policeman, taxi-driver or school teacher who has mortgaged himself to the hilt to buy a
two- or three-decker building in which he and his family occupy one floor." Id. at 563,
n.403.
28. Id. at 563.
29. Lochhead, supra, note 12, at 39.
30. See D. GREENWALD & AssOCIATES, THE MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF MOD-
ERN ECONOMICS: A HANDBOOK OF TERMS AND ORGANIZATIONS 365-366 (2d ed. 1973) (a
means test requires that applicants for public assistance prove their need to become eligible
to receive benefits).
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rent control, are the middle and upper classes rather than the
poor.31 Second and more important, as discussed later, this form
31. This is amply demonstrated by noting some prosperous cities that utilize rent
control.
Ostensibly aimed at helping poor tenants, rent control seems to proliferate in
cities with large proportions of middle- and upper-income tenants. Beverly Hills,
Santa Monica, Berkeley, Palm Springs and Los Gatos, all prosperous California
cities, control rents. So do many of New Jersey's affluent suburbs. "Clearly, the
major beneficiary is a population that is firmly entrenched in the middle class,"
says a study by Richard Devine of the Center for Community Change in Oak-
land, Calif. . . . The accounting firm Arthur D. Little Inc. found that in New
York City, upper-income tenants each year are spared $500 million via rent reg-
ulation; lower-income tenants are spared $110 million.
Lochhead, supra, note 12, at 38.
The only beneficiaries of rent control are those who have leases at the time the
law is adopted. To the extent key money [a finder's fee collected by the current
tenant from the new tenant] represents the present value of saving [due to the
rent controls], all subsequent tenants pay not the controlled rent, but rather the
market rent. (Of course the market rent is higher than it would be in the ab-
sence of rent control, because rent control depresses the supply [by reducing the
rent the landlord actually receives].) Seen in this light, rent control is a law
which transfers part of the ownership rights of a rental property from the land-
lord to the original tenant. Among other things, this ought to make it clear that
any income redistribution emanating from rent control bears little resemblance
to the income redistribution that would emerge from a conscious policy to help
the poor. Even if all renters are poor, rent control helps the first generation of
renters at the expense not only of landlords but also of subsequent generations of
renters.
E. MIL.S & B. HAMILTON, URBAN EcoNoMIcs 245-246 (4th ed. 1989).
It may seem that the prospective tenant would pay key money only equal to the
present value of rent savings during his or her own expected period of occu-
pancy. But this is not the case. One of the benefits the new tenant acquires upon
getting a rent-controlled apartment is the right to charge key money when he or
she moves out.
Id. at 245, n.23.
This problem is further illustrated in a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio:
Urban planners warn of middle-class flight by those who perceive the movement
by Clevelanders into Lakewood as a harbinger of deterioration and plummeting
property values. But, they say, strict adherence to standards - building codes,
traffic codes, and local ordinances - is the only way to keep new residents in
line and old residents from moving away. . . . Walter Geist [building commis-
sioner for the City of Lakewood, Ohio] dismisses critics with a derisive wave of
his hand. "People get angry when they have to do something that costs them
money," he says. "But they'd be a lot angrier if property values declined. I have
no problem with enforcement .. " The consensus among urban planners who
have visited Lakewood is to applaud Geist for his extremism. They say such an
attitude is necessary when more and more homes in a city are being purchased
by lower-income residents with little or no down payment. . . . Residents who
are heavily mortgaged have no money for critical repairs to old homes, and as
decay sets in, appalled neighbors move out.
Theiss, Lakewood: Tough Enough?, CLEVELAND MAG., Nov. 1988, at 71, 72 & 110; see
also Fleetwood & Eichenwald, There's Nothing Liberal About Rent Control, WASH.
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of judicial market intervention in the long run will fail to have the
desired effect of reducing poverty by making better housing avail-
able to the poor. 2 Although the goal may be proper, the policy is
counterproductive in light of the goal.
II. TRENDS IN HOUSING QUALITY
While the problems of low quality housing for the poor in the
United States are not insignificant, it is worth placing the
problems in perspective. "Americans are housed better than at
any time in our history, and surely better than the citizens of al-
most any other country."33 From 1940 to 1980, the percentage of
dwellings lacking at least one component of basic plumbing fell
from 55.4 percent to 2.7 percent.34 Over the same period, the per-
centage of dwelling units with more than 1.5 persons per room fell
from nine percent to one percent and, in 1980, 60 percent had
fewer than one-half person per room.35
[T]he obvious and easily quantifiable indices of housing quality
- crowding and plumbing deficiency - have been virtually
eliminated by 1980. This means, among other things, that mea-
surement of subsequent changes in housing quality will be more
difficult. The nation is now eliminating structural and other de-
fects that are less easily measured. But even taking into account
these problems, the best available evidence shows that the qual-
ity of housing has continued to improve during the early '80s. In
particular, it appears that the quality of low-income housing has
continued to improve.36
Overall, low-income renters have shared significantly in the im-
provement in housing quality, at least for the decade 1974-83,"
but rental housing nevertheless "contains a majority of the over-
crowded and substandard urban units."3
If rental housing generally has improved in quality through
time, what explains the rising concern with habitability over the
last twenty years? The answer lies in the fact that even as the
MONTHLY, June 1986, at 19 (primary beneficiaries of rent control are the middle and
upper classes, rather than the poor).
32. See infra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
33. E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 217.
34. Id. Basic components of plumbing include hot water and a toilet. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 217-18.
37. Id. at 218.
38. J. HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 303 (3d ed. 1987).
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quality of housing was improving, the focus of housing dissatisfac-
tion shifted away from the quality of the structures themselves,
toward the quality of the neighborhood environment. 39 "[T]he
quality of life offered by a dwelling unit depends to an important
degree on the character of the neighborhood in which it is lo-
cated." Deterioration in the quality of individual housing units is
tied to the deterioration of neighborhoods into slums.41 Racial seg-
regation and discrimination, as well as poverty, are tied to the
quality and characteristics of neighborhoods.42 The continued
prosperity of the 1950s and '60s brought rising expectations about
the quality of life society could and should provide its citizens.4
The civil rights movement, the anti-war/anti-establishment
counterculture, and changes in political and legal institutions each
contributed to the call for improved housing.44
III. THE ECONOMICS OF RENTAL HOUSING
Many of the problems relating to the quality and availability
of housing are explained by its rather unique characteristics.45
Housing is an extremely durable capital asset. Notwithstanding
the Internal Revenue Code, "housing appears to depreciate less
than 1 percent per year."46 In any given year, 97 to 98 percent of
housing services are supplied by previously existing housing
stock.47 Housing is essentially immovable and the basic features of
39. Id. at 302, 320.
40. E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 229.
41. See id.
42. For a discussion of the effects of racial segregation and discrimination on neigh-
borhoods, see id. at 233-39 (noting that segregation and discrimination effectively create
two separate housing markets, which in turn affect the composition of the neighborhood).
For a discussion of the effect of poverty on neighborhoods, see J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38,
at 319-25 (arguing that ghetto redevelopment programs are inherently limited by the resi-
dential nature of the neighborhoods and the expansion of inner city blight).
43. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 540-554.
44. Id. at 549. It is interesting to note that Judge J. Skelly Wright, who wrote the
Javins and Robinson opinions, acknowledged in a letter to Edward Rabin that he "was
indeed influenced by the fact that, during the nationwide racial turmoil of the sixties and
the unrest caused by the injustice of racially selective service in Vietnam, most of the
tenants in Washington, D.C. slums were poor and black and most of the landlords were
rich and white." Id. Judge Wright felt he did what he "could to ameliorate, if not elimi-
nate, the injustice involved in the way many of the poor were required to live in the na-
tion's capital." Id.
45. See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 221; J. HEILBRUN, supra note
38, at 303.
46. E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 221.
47. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 303.
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an existing housing unit are rather inflexible, especially for pur-
poses of upgrading.48 Existing housing responds to market forces
primarily through changes in quality and rental price.49
If the adjustment of supply to changes in demand could take
place only through new construction, the process would be even
more cumbersome, slow, and expensive than in fact it is. Fortu-
nately, adjustments on the supply side take place not only
through new construction but also through a series of complex
changes by which the quality of existing units, and therefore
their rent level, is "adapted" to the pattern of demand expressed
in the market for housing services.50
The supply of housing for any particular income class equals
housing newly constructed for that housing market plus housing
vacated by higher or, possibly, lower income classes and housing
converted from other uses, minus housing lost to higher or lower
income markets and housing converted to other uses.5 When
profits are pushed below a "normal profit," investors will shift
their resources into the next best alternative use for their re-
sources. 52 For owners of residential rental property, next best al-
ternative uses could include conversion to condominiums, offices,
warehouses, or even demolition or abandonment, depending on the
demand for these uses at the location of the property. 53 How
much housing is added to or subtracted from a particular housing
market will be determined by the expected profit from doing so.54
New housing is created primarily for higher income classes since
the present value of the rents for larger, higher-quality housing is
generally expected to be greater than construction costs, while the
reverse is expected for lower income housing. 55 As the wealthier
move into newly constructed rental housing, vacated rental units
48. See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 221.
49. See id. at 228-29.
50. J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 303.
51. See id. at 310-312, 317-320, 484-487; E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31,
at 213-215.
52. Normal profits are "the imputed returns to capital and risk taking just necessary
to prevent the owners from withdrawing from the industry. These normal profits are...
the opportunity costs of risk taking and capital." R. LIsEY, P. STEINER, & D. PURVIS,
MICROECONOMICS 168 (8th ed. 1988) [hereinafter R. LIPSEY]. "If a firm's . . . profit is
less than that normally received by firms with comparable levels of investment and risks, in
the long run its owners will move their resources into ventures where at least normal profits
are expected." R. BYRNS & G. STONE, supra note 14, at 445-46.
53. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 319-320, 340.
54. See id. at 305; R. LIPSEY, supra note 52, at 168.
55. See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 228.
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filter down through the lower income housing markets."6 While
the vacated rental units filtering down through the housing mar-
kets are typically of lesser quality, or at least are perceived as less
desirable, than the newly acquired units, they are generally of bet-
ter quality than the existing housing stock within the income/
quality market into which they fall.67
Demand for housing of any particular quality in a given area
will be determined in part by household preferences, but to a large
extent it will be determined by income, the rents charged,58 and
the total number of households seeking housing of that quality.
Rents for each housing quality class will be determined by de-
mand and supply within that market,59 which are in turn influ-
enced by the rents determined within the markets for housing of
lesser or greater quality. 60 Excess demand and excess supply may
filter up or down the housing quality markets, depending upon
whether there exists excess demand or excess supply in the mar-
kets above or below the market for a particular quality of hous-
ing.61 Generally, there is an excess supply of low-income hous-
ing. 2 This puts downward pressure on rents for low-income
housing. If the ability of low-income tenants to pay falls short of
the rent required by landlords to make a normal profit on the
units as they currently exist, a landlord must cut costs and/or sub-
divide the units in order to maintain a normal profit6 3 Otherwise,
56. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 310-311; E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra
note 31, at 228. "Filtering is a natural consequence of deterioration and income growth."
Id.
57. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 310.
58. See id. at 306.
59. See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 185-197.
60. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 310-312.
61. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 304 (1987); E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON,
supra note 31, at 222-223. Excess demand is
a situation in which the amount of a good or service which buyers wish to buy
exceeds that which sellers are prepared to sell. The result is that the price is bid
up, inducing sellers to increase the quantity they are prepared to sell, and buyers
to reduce the quantity they wish to buy. Price will continue to rise until excess
demand is eliminated ....
G. BANNOCK, supra note 25, at 151. Excess supply is the reverse situation which "causes
sellers to bid down prices, thus causing an increase in the quantity demanded and a de-
crease in the quantity offered for sale, until [quantity supplied] and [quantity demanded]
are equal." Id.
62. See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 222-223 and 243-244.
63. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 305 ("owners can 'move' their buildings from
one rent class to another by remodeling, dividing, or combining units or by changing the
level of outlays for operation and maintenance. . . .The owner's objective is to maintain
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the landlord will remove the property from the residential rental
market or, if there is no alternative profitable use, simply abandon
it.64
IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY
There are essentially four situations in which the impact of
the warranty of habitability can be analyzed: "(1) sound neigh-
borhoods - those with well-maintained structures -with stable
or rising property values, (2) deteriorated neighborhoods with ris-
ing property values, (3) sound neighborhoods with declining prop-
erty values and (4) deteriorated neighborhoods with stable or de-
clining property values." 5 In the first situation, by definition, the
housing stock will be mostly habitable, and to the extent that
compliance increases a rental property's value, thereby reflecting
the community's expectations as to adequate housing, the owner
will presumably voluntarily comply.6 6 To the extent that compli-
ance does not increase the property's rental value, profits will be
reduced and, if reduced below a normal profit, the property will be
removed from the rental housing market.6 7 This, however, is not
housing that is filtering down to low income tenants. On the con-
trary, rising property values reflect excess demand for this housing
and a filtering up.68 It would appear that imposing the warranty
of habitability in this situation would do little to alleviate the
plight of the poor.
A similar scenario applies to the second situation, with one
possible exception.
The argument for code enforcement in this kind of neighborhood
is that it will enable the redevelopment process to take place by
restoring the owner's confidence that his property improvements
and operate a building at the level of quality that will maximize profits.") (footnote omit-
ted); Abbott, supra note 11, at 75 ("As a structure filters down into the low income hous-
ing market, landlords must charge lower rents or subdivide the living space to offer less
space per unit.").
64. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 317-320. "Why do property owners abandon
title? Stated in its most sterile form, they do so whenever (1) income from the property
cannot cover operating costs and (2) the value of the cleared land is less than demolition
cost." E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 224.
65. Abbott, supra note 11, at 67.
66. Id. at 67-69.
67. Id. at 68.
68. Stable property values reflect a balance between supply and demand and, there-
fore, neither filtering down nor up.
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will be matched by improvements throughout the neighborhood.
In this type of neighborhood, whether uncertainty
about a neighbor's investment decision significantly impedes the
process is unclear. . . .Perhaps the most significant deterrents
to the process are crime, trash in the streets and lack of public
services. Housing code enforcement [through the warranty of
habitability or otherwise] has no direct impact on these
.problems unless, by removing low income residents, it lessens
any social problems associated with them. . . . Low income
families . . . in the neighborhood may constitute a perceived ex-
ternal cost to other[s] . ..contemplating redevelopment ...
Housing code enforcement . . . will compel substantial disloca-
tion. . . .The shrinkage in the low income housing supply will
produce both increased rents in whatever low income housing
remains and displacement from the neighborhood for those who
cannot afford to pay higher rents.
6 9
Again, this is a situation where housing is filtering up, not down.
Application of the warranty of habitability in the third situa-
tion should be viewed primarily as an attempt to slow or stop the
filtering down process in the neighborhood.70 "[E]ffective code en-
forcement prevents the expansion of the supply of deteriorating
housing but does not prevent and should actually hasten the with-
drawal of units from the market."'1 This should not be surprising.
Unless the excess supply leading to deteriorating property values
reverses, some landlords, caught between declining rents and the
costs of complying with the warranty, will remove their property
from the residential rental market. In the absence of anticonver-
sion laws 2 or other barriers to exit from the residential rental
69. Abbott, supra note 11, at 70-72.
70. See id. at 74; see generally Theiss, supra note 31, at 71 (in response to Cleve-
landers' flight from the City into the suburb of Lakewood, the Lakewood city planners are
calling for strict enforcement of the housing policy to fight housing deterioration).
71. Abbott, supra note 11, at 75.
72. See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 733-742 (discussion of the effects of limi-
tations on condominium conversion).
It is interesting to note that in the 1960s Congress actually supported conversion of
low-income housing to condominiums as an economic incentive for private developers to
build low-income housing. In addition to providing tax breaks and federal loans, Congress
promised that "[a]fter 20 years, building owners could pay off the loans and turn the units
into apartments or condominiums for more affluent residents." Celis, Builders Sue to Con-
vert Low-Income Housing, Wall St. J., June 19, 1989, at BI, col. 1. Thus far Congress has
had a change of heart, placing a moratorium on the conversion by disallowing early loan
payoffs through February 1990. Id. The analysis of this Note suggests that this Congres-
sional reneging would have a negative impact on the long-run supply of low-income housing
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market, property not earning a normal profit will be removed and
the supply of rental housing will shrink until only normal profits
are being received by landlords in the long run. 3 In the mean-
while, "[e]ffective housing code enforcement will limit . . . subdi-
vision ... [and] ...will prevent the landlords from reducing
operating expenses. . . .The displacement of tenants from these
units causes increased competition for available low income hous-
ing elsewhere."74
[Finally,] the impact of effective code enforcement in a deterio-
rated neighborhood with stable or declining property values is
either to increase overcrowding and housing prices for low in-
come consumers or to decrease profitability to owners to the ex-
tent that they are forced to absorb code compliance costs. The
latter effect has long-term consequences for the low income
housing supply. Housing that would otherwise have filtered
down within the financial reach of low income consumers may
instead be withdrawn and converted to other uses as owners,
faced with the prospect of continuing code compliance costs, find
that the financial means of their consumers will not pay the
costs of standard housing.75
V. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AND THE LONG-RUN SUPPLY OF
HABITABLE HOUSING
The warranty of habitability increases costs both directly,
through increased maintenance expenditures, and indirectly,
through increased landlord uncertainty as to actual costs and reve-
nues due to the increased risk of tenant-initiated legal actions.7 6 If
by reducing the profits developers might expect from future government contracts to build
housing.
73. Short-run alternative uses for rental property may be nonexistent. In this case,
rental property will not be abandoned so long as rents cover current operating costs, but
maintenance will be discontinued until the stock of rental housing shrinks enough a-id rents
rise enough so that a normal profit is once again obtained. See R. LIPSEY, supra note 52, at
102-103.
74. Abbott, supra note I I, at 75.
75. Id. at 79-80. In the jargon of economists, the long-run effect of the increased
costs due to compliance with the warranty of habitability is to shrink the relative supply of
low-quality housing through the removal of rental units until excess demand is created at
the existing rental rates. Units continue to be removed and excess demand created at cur-
rent rental rates until the upward pressure on rents produces a normal profit for the re-
maining rental units.
76. Tenants' ability to use the legal system to their advantage and landlords' concern
over this possibility should not be underestimated.
Tenants increasingly are using bankruptcy and pro-tenant laws to avoid eviction
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the warranty of habitability increases the uncertainty of costs and
revenues from residential rental property, the expected profit will
actually have to increase to compensate for the increased risk. 7
This is because "investors are averse to risk".78 Risk averse indi-
viduals will accept more risk from an investment only if the ex-
pected profits also increase.79 For a given increase in risk, the only
options for increasing expected profits are to cut costs or raise
rents. The warranty of habitability limits the possibilities to cut
costs in providing low-income housing, while the limited ability of
or beat landlords out of rent payments.. .. [For example,] a Los Angeles land-
lord filed to evict a tenant for nonpayment of back rent. The tenant had moved.
But his roommate was still living in the apartment, and her name had never
appeared on the lease or, consequently, on the eviction notice. She successfully
sued the landlord, claiming her due process had been violated. Many California
tenants use that precedent to avoid eviction. Typically, after being served with
eviction papers, a tenant enlists a friend to pose as a roommate or spouse. The
friend's due-process claim halts eviction and can take up to 60 days to resolve.
About 3,000 claims were filed last year in Los Angeles alone, '97% of which
were found to be without merit by the city's courts. Tenants in several states also
are using federal bankruptcy statutes. A bankruptcy filing triggers a stay of evic,
tion and can enable a tenant to skip rent payments for up to three months as the
filing is processed. Some tenants then drop the filing and skip out. The tenant's
credit history isn't tainted because bankruptcy filings, if not completed, don't
appear on credit records.
Tenants Grow Adept at Legal Maneuvering, Wall Street J., Apr. 5, 1988, at 39, col. 1.
Getting evictions, even when tenants do not pay rent, is difficult, often requiring
going to court. "Even when you win, you lose, Hwang [a Jersey City landlord]
says. "One case dragged on two months. Then they move out, together with your
rent, your fridge, break your windows ...." Bernstein [president of the Small
Property Owners of New York] tells of a pending nonpayment eviction she has
filed that twice was thrown out of court, once on a technicality and once because
the city lost the file. The tenant has since reported a violation: A window does
not open and close smoothly. "Now what he's going to be doing is calling [the
city housing agency] on a regular basis," she says. "If violations do not exist, he
will damage the apartment, and we'll go to court. And you know what? The
court's going to say, 'Make the repairs, you bad landlord, or we're going to put
you in jail.' If he plays his cards right, he can live rent-free for two or three
years and then vacate, and I can't do anything." Legal aid lawyers have kept
Casalinuovo [a landlord in New York's Chinatown] in court for three years over
a $16-a-month rent increase.
Lochhead, supra note 12, at 39.
77. See H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 227-
39 (2d ed. 1990).
78. J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 265 (4th ed.
1977).
79. See generally G. MADDALA & E. MILLER, MICROECONOMIcS: THEORY AND AP-
PLICATIONs 594-598 (1989) (The greater the individual's aversion to risk, the more ex-
pected profit must increase before he will invest); H. VARIAN, supra note 77, at 234-37
(discussing a formula for adjusting returns based on the uncertainty of the investments).
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the poor to pay makes it difficult, if not impossible, to raise rents
at the current quantity of low-income housing supplied. The only
way expected profits can rise then is for the long-run supply of
low-income housing to decrease. Thus, the increased risk produced
by the warranty of habitability provides further incentive for the
supply of low-income rental housing to decrease. The risk of liti-
gation exists, albeit to a lesser degree, even if a landlord attempts
to fully comply with the housing code, since a landlord cannot
hope to have every infraction instantaneously rectified at every
point in time. Also, tenants may initiate an action for breach of
warranty for purposes not contemplated by the habitability laws."
This analysis of the uncertainty the warranty of habitability
introduces into the rental housing market leads to another inter-
esting conclusion. Landlords, in an attempt to reduce risk, will at-
tempt to discriminate against "riskier" tenants who might com-
plain or bring suit.8' Some landlords may be willing to take a
lower actual rent from a less risky tenant. If the actual rent
charged need be reduced only slightly below the market rent to
attract significantly less risky tenants, the landlords' expected
profits might actually be increased at the same time that risk is
reduced. But even if expected profits are reduced by this form of
discrimination, by the preceding analysis, risk averse landlords
may be willing to accept lower expected profits in order to reduce
their risk. 2 Of course, who this type of discrimination will affect
in practice will depend on the landlords' experiences and percep-
tions as to which tenants, or classes of tenants, pose this risk.83
VI. THE WARRANTY ALONE WILL NOT PROVIDE HABITABLE
HOUSING FOR THE POOR
The problem of inadequate housing for the poor is two-sided;
it derives from insufficient tenant income and, in the absence of
sufficient tenant income, from economic pressures on landlords to
either lower the quality of housing units filtering down or else re-
80. See supra notes 12 and 76.
81. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 575.
82. Although this seems to be the point made by Rabin, supra note 5, at 575, he
does not explicitly apply an expected-utility or risk-return analysis.
83. Lawyers and law students, perhaps? See, e.g., Kramarsky v. Stahl, 92 Misc. 2d
1030, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977) (landlord's rejection of a tenant-applicant because she was
"a lawyer attuned to her legal rights" as opposed to one "who was likely to be less in-
formed and more passive" was upheld).
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
move them from the residential rental market altogether.84 Rais-
ing housing standards through the warranty of habitability, taken
by itself, serves only to increase the costs to landlords of providing
low-income housing, decreasing the rate of return on the land-
lord's investment and further reducing the incentive to provide
quality low-income housing. 85 While some individuals may obtain
improved housing, these individuals may not be the poor.86 Even
when they are,
the empirical evidence indicates that costs imposed on such te-
nants appear to outweigh the benefits derived by them. Thus, by
enacting habitability laws, and thereby shifting some of the
power away from landlords, the welfare of low-income tenants
may not be improved, but the amount of substandard housing in
SMSAs [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas] is reduced."
The extent to which the warranty of habitability adversely
affects the market for low-income housing will depend in part on
how strictly the standards are enforced88 and what remedies are
made available to tenants.88 The effects of the warranty of habita-
bility on low-income housing will be accentuated as the standards
for habitable housing are set higher. This is because the higher
the required standards for a habitable dwelling, the more the im-
plied warranty of habitability raises the costs for landlords to
comply. As one moves from high-income to low-income housing,
the costs of compliance increasingly rise and the rents obtainable
increasingly fall, strengthening the incentive to remove property
from the residential rental market the farther down the filtering
process one goes. This is important because it is not the purpose of
this Note to say the warranty of habitability is totally unjustifi-
able. Using the warranty to enforce "the actual but unexpressed
agreement of the parties"90 and basic health and safety standards
may be sufficiently in the public interest to justify the consequent
84. See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 45-83 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 30-31, 65-83 and accompanying text.
87. Hirsch & Law, Habitability Laws and the Shrinkage of Substandard Rental
Housing Stock, 16 URB. STUD. 19, 27 (1979).
88. See Abbott, supra note 11, at 49-66; Hirsch & Hirsch, The Changing Landlord-
Tenant Relationship in California: An Economic Analysis of the Swinging Pendulum, 14
Sw. U.L. REV. 2, 5 (1983).
89. Discussion of the various remedies and their effects can be found in Abbott,
supra note 1I, at 4-40 & 126-38, Glendon, supra note 5, at 503, 532-35, and Hirsch &
Hirsch, supra note 88, at 8-18.
90. Rabin, supra note 5, at 583.
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reduction in the supply of low-income housing. As an analogy,
while "legislation prohibiting discrimination . . . may reduce the
profits of landlords and to this extent discourage the production or
preservation of rental housing . . . their cost in these terms is
[likely] justified by the noneconomic goals that they achieve."91
But pressing higher standards as a mechanism for redistributing
income is counterproductive of the goal of improving the welfare
of the poor.92
VII. INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND THE EXTRACTION OF
QUASI-RENTS
Despite the general agreement among economists that habita-
bility laws, taken by themselves, will reduce the long-run supply of
low income housing, at least one commentator has.recently advo-
cated selective enforcement of the warranty of habitability as a
method to help the poor based on an analysis of housing market
filtering. a The filtering model "suggests that the rent for build-
91. Id. at 583-584.
92. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 88, at 42-43; see also Hirsch & Law, supra
note 87, at 27:
[I] f we want to decrease the relative prevalence of substandard rental housing in
metropolitan areas, we should seek enactment and enforcement of laws that ex-
tend the warranty of habitability in a decisive manner. . . . However, . . . hab-
itability laws initially have been promulgated not so much for the purpose of
contributing to the shrinkage of substandard housing, than to assist low-income
tenants.
Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent Tenants, 63 REv. ECON. & STAT.
263, 274 (1981):
To the extent that habitability laws are mainly designed to improve the welfare
of indigent tenants, the laws have failed, at least in the sample studied ...
Regulations, whether issued by the legislature or the courts, appear unable to
improve the welfare of indigent tenants significantly. Matters are likely to be
different if such regulations are accompanied by [direct] income transfers, so
that indigents can afford to pay for improved housing. When directives to pro-
vide habitable housing are supplemented by rent subsidies, for example, signifi-
cant welfare improvements of indigent tenants are more likely than where
merely law extend the warranty of habitability.
(footnote omitted).
93. Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing:
"Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 485, 485-486 (1987). Kennedy ac-
knowledges that his analysis is based on the earlier works of Ackerman, Regulating Slum
Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and In-
come Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971) and Markovitz, The Distributive
Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some
Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1815 (1976).
Rabin, supra note 5, at 560-561, though, argues that:
Markovitz's analysis . . . is fatally flawed. At most, he proves only that certain
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ings at the very end of the chain will eventually decline to a level
that reflects only the price of ongoing maintenance (plus taxes)
and premiums for good location. In other words, the Ricardian
quasi-rent for the structures themselves should decline'to zero." 94
"Ongoing maintenance" here is assumed to mean "current operat-
ing costs," since that is what the filtering model predicts will be
the minimum acceptable rent if the property is not to be aban-
doned.95 A Ricardian quasi-rent is the amount received by an ex-
isting resource (here, the rental structures) in its current use in
excess of what the resource could earn in its best short-run alter-
native use (i.e., it is the amount received in excess of the re-
source's short-run opportunity cost).96 When the quasi-rents for
existing rental buildings with no positively valued short-run alter-
native uses decline to zero, the buildings are at the end of the
tenants will be helped by a code enforcement program more than certain other
tenants will be injured. . . . Assuming that Markovitz's analysis is correct and
that the dollar amount of the former is greater than the dollar amount of the
latter, this still leaves the injured tenants worse off than before code enforcement
because code enforcement programs do not provide a mechanism by which bene-
fited tenants compensate injured tenants. In Markovitz's model, the injured te-
nants are the poorest tenants, and the benefited tenants are the wealthier
tenants.
It has been established elsewhere that the Ackerman analysis suffers from very restrictive
assumptions (one being a perfectly fixed supply of hoising) and, more importantly, is a
strictly short-run economic analysis. See generally W. HIRsCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 45 (1979) (Ackerman's short-run solution does not take into
account landlord reactions to enforcement of habitability laws.); Abbott, supra note I1, at
108-115 (Ackerman's analysis is flawed because it does not adequately explore "code en-
forcement"); Hirsch, Hirsch, & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitabil-
ity Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 1098, 1100 (1975) (Ackerman's article is "an entirely theoretical piece
which offered no empirical evidence to support the hypotheticals presented."); Komesar,
Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement
and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1192 (1973) (The problem with Ackerman's analysis
was its desire to promote a program before issues basic to the choice of any program had
been stated, let alone solved."). Kennedy's analysis is also a short-run economic analysis, as
discussed in the text infra.
94. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 487.
95. See R. LIPSEY, supra note 52, at 102-103; E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note
31, at 224.
96. See G. BANNOCK, supra note 25, at 340; R. CLOWER, P. GRAVES, & R. SEXTON,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 415-417 (1988) [hereinafter R. CLOWER]; J. GOULD &
E. LAZEAR, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 433-435 (6th ed. 1989).
The "premiums for good location" are actually economic rents, not quasi-rents, and
are not very relevant to the discussion here. R. CLOWER, supra at 409-416. It is important
to distinguish the economic return to the rental structure from the return to the land upon
which the structure sits, since structures can be removed from the market in the long run
(through deterioration or demolition) but land itself generally cannot. Id. at 419.
(Vol. 40:525
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
filtering chain and the long-run normal profit on these existing
structures has declined to zero." The existence of nonzero quasi-
rents is important to the argument in favor of using the warranty
of habitability to help the poor, because, to the extent that there
exist alternative uses to which the structures can be converted in
the short run (i.e., to the extent that positive normal profits exist
in the short run), increasing landlords' costs and reducing their
profits would reduce the existing supply of low-income housing in
the short run.
Professor Kennedy proposes that the warranty of habitability
should be selectively enforced against landlords who cannot shift
their residential rental buildings to other uses in the short-run. Es-
sentially what is being argued is that society should take advan-
tage of the inability of landlords to shift existing housing struc-
tures to alternative uses in order to redistribute quasi-rent from
landlords to tenants through the warranty of habitability." But
this is essentially an argument that, in the long run, society should
deny some landlords a normal profit. What, in the long run, is a
normal profit on rental structures becomes a quasi-rent on existing
structures in the short run only for those structures that cannot be
converted to any alternative use.99 The investors' response, should
this proposal be enacted, would be to discontinue new investment
97. Operating costs could include compensation for the owner's current labor ser-
vices in operating the facility, but not a return on the owner's investment in the structure
itself.
98. Why stop with landlords? All residential property owners have imputed quasi-
rents to the extent that they are unwilling to become tenants (i.e., renting from someone
else). Why not force all residential property owners with quasi-rents sufficient to maintain
habitable premises to rent out a portion of their home (e.g., any bedrooms in excess of
occupants) at la rate just sufficient to cover operating costs? Besides the fact that many
would argue this is somehow inherently unfair, I suspect the long-run stock of owner-occu-
pied housing would adjust so that most homes had no room for renters.
99. Long-run normal profits represent quasi-rents to the extent that the best alter-
native use in the short run yields a lesser return than the best long-run alternative use. If
there is no profitable alternative use in the short run, the entire amount of long-run profits
are quasi-rents in the short-run. See generally R. CLOWER, supra note 96, at 415-420.
In a short-run period . . . specialized capital equipment [such as a rental struc-
ture with no alternative use] is . . . perfectly inelastic in supply, and cost of
production is not relevant once it has been produced. Thus, in a short period, the
return on [rental structures] . . . is similar to land rent; it may be designated as
quasi-rent. But this is a short-period phenomenon only; since [rental structures]
are produced and wear out, over a long period the return is dependent upon the
cost of production of the equipment and must cover this cost plus an interest
return on the money [invested].
Id. at 419. This interest return includes any risk premium. Id. at 423.
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in residential rental housing, or, in the alternative, to establish a
long-run investment policy of converting residential rental housing
to other uses before the extraction of normal profits begins, i.e.,
before residential rental property filters down to where the war-
ranty of habitability becomes a serious issue. Therefore, while it is
conceivable that this proposal would benefit some poor tenants in
the short run (specifically, those tenants in existing housing with
no alternative use and whose landlords obtain enough quasi-rent
to finance compliance with the warranty of habitability rather
than abandon their buildings), the long-run impact is to shrink the
supply of low-income housing.
Another argument made in favor of this proposal is that its
implementation will break the "'downward vicious cycle' in those
neighborhoods that are at the end of the filtering chain.""' The
idea is that the warranty will reduce or eliminate "negative exter-
nalities" - the adverse effects on the neighborhood when the de-
cision to undermaintain by some landlords accelerates the deci-
sions of other landlords to undermaintain their properties.
Because of these . . . externalities, it is possible for all the land-
lords in a neighborhood to find themselves "forced" to make in-
vestment decisions that all agree are worse for them than those
that would occur if it were possible for them to act in concert.
For example, every landlord might be able to invest more in
maintenance of existing structures, hoping thereby to get higher
rents and increase property values, were it not for the fact that
each believes that others are and will continue disinvesting, so
that the neighborhood is in an inevitable state of decline.'
But if this is a neighborhood at the end of the filtering chain, how
can landlords hope to obtain higher rents and property values
through improved maintenance? They cannot, unless this neigh-
borhood is expected to filter back up the chain. And if it does
filter up, low-income households will be dislocated.
This second argument in favor of the warranty of habitability
appears to confuse two different, although somewhat related, goals
- arresting urban blight and alleviating poverty. A policy
designed to correct one of these problems may not correct the
other. For example, it may be possible to slow or stop urban blight
by using the warranty of habitability to keep poor people from
moving into a sound neighborhood with declining property values,
100. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 513.
101. Id. at 512-513.
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but this obviously does not help the very poor. On the other hand,
direct income transfers to the poor will alleviate poverty, at least
for the duration of the payments, but they might not arrest urban
blight in a particular area, since the poor in that area will now
presumably be free to move out."°2
VIII. ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF THE
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
If one's central goal is to provide habitable housing for the
poor, the warranty of habitability has only a minor role to play.
The major hurdle is to make habitable housing affordable to the
poor. Once the poor can afford habitable housing, the warranty
may be a useful device to help guarantee that tenants get what
they bargained for and that their dwellings meet minimum health
and safety standards.
Housing subsidies paid directly to tenants' are to be pre-
ferred to public housing projects and subsidies paid directly to
landlords or housing contractors as a method for making habitable
housing affordable to the poor for several reasons. First, "supply-
oriented programs [for new construction of low-income housing or
public housing] are almost twice as expensive as demand-oriented
programs." 0 4 This result follows directly from the filtering pro-
102. In contrast, supporting resident efforts to renovate existing structures in con-
junction with subsidizing tenant purchases of abandoned or publicly-owned housing ap-
pears not only to alleviate poverty, but also to arrest urban blight. See infra notes 114-19
and accompanying text.
103. Housing subsidies to tenants could be paid either in cash or "in kind" in the
form of housing vouchers or certificates. Recipients would generally prefer the subsidy in
the form of cash, since that would most improve the recipient's welfare, but the grantor
(presumably the government and, indirectly, the taxpayers) would generally prefer to give
the subsidy in kind. See T. POGUE & L. SGONTZ, supra note 23, at 131. Other methods of
making in-kind transfers of housing have included turning ownership of public housing over
to tenants and selling abandoned or (tax-deficient) forfeited housing to the poor at ex-
tremely low prices with the proviso that the property be properly maintained. See Shapiro,
supra note 23, at 20, 23; Celis, Detroit Suburb Sells Homes to Poor for $1, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 23, 1988, at 17, col. 2.
104. E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 243; see also J. HEILBRUN, supra
note 38, at 355 ("[F]or a given federal outlay, about twice as many households can be
assisted with housing allowances as could be served by new construction."). A reasonable
alternative to building new low-income housing is to repair existing publicly-owned struc-
tures where available. "Fixing existing housing is still cheaper than building new units. It
now costs between $65,000 and $70,000 to gut and rehabilitate an apartment in a vacant
building [in New York City], but $120,000 to build a new apartment." Minerbrook, The
Big-City Push to Fill the Housing Gap for the Poor, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT 28, 28
(Aug. 28/Sept. 4, 1989). Unfortunately, many cities have razed vacant buildings, leaving
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cess in the market for housing." 5
In most cities there is a surplus. . . of low-income housing..
Not surprisingly, a major effect of new construction of low-in-
come housing is that this glut becomes more serious, and the
new units provide housing services worth only a fraction of the
construction cost. [This] probably also aggravates the abandon-
ment problem and certainly hastens housing retirement in other
neighborhoods. °06
Second, direct subsidies (i.e., transfer payments) to tenants
provide more housing options and greater freedom in choosing
where to locate.' 07 In turn, this may help reduce segregation. Also,
since recipients of direct housing subsidies can choose where to
live (to the extent that income plus subsidy allows it), it is un-
likely that there will be the sort of confrontations that sometimes
occur between current residents and government and/or the new
residents when low-income public housing is integrated into a
higher-income community.
Third, direct subsidies to tenants are more equitable than the
construction of new housing or subsidiaries paid to landlords. 8
They are easily disbursed according to a "means tested"
formula. 0 9 A "standard" rent for adequate housing would be de-
termined for households of various sizes. This would be the maxi-
mum subsidy allowed and would be phased out at some pre-deter-
mined rate as the recipient's income rises from zero." 0 This
"housing gap formula" works in much the same way as the fed-
eral food stamp program"' and, other than the limitation that the
subsidy be used on housing, very much like the negative income
fewer to rehabilitate. Id. at 29.
105. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 348-352.
106. E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 243-244.
107. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 356.
For that reason, they are opposed by spokespeople for builders, banks, and local
governments, all of whom now share in government programs to subsidize low-
income housing. Housing allowances would circumvent such groups, placing
money directly in the hands of intended beneficiaries and encouraging them to
spend the money to their best advantage, subject only to the restriction that they
inhabit housing deemed adequate.
E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 243.
108. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 355.
109. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
110. See J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 351-353.
111. See D. FUSFELD, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 578 (3d ed.
1988).
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tax proposals. 1  This formulation would have an important rami-
fication for the low-income housing market.
It provides benefits based not on actual rent paid but on the
estimated standard rent for adequate housing. The tenant who
can find adequate housing at less than the standard rent "keeps
the change"; the tenant who wants housing that rents for more
than the standard pays the difference out of his or her own
pocket. At the margin, the tenant is paying the rent and is cor-
respondingly drawn into the market process as an active partici-
pant. Thus housing allowances, under this formula, do not create
a class of passive tenant beneficiaries, as some welfare housing
assistance programs do.113
One alternative to cash payments or vouchers for housing,11 4
which appears to work successfully in at least certain instances, is
to allow community groups or individual tenants to renovate aban-
doned or publicly-owned buildings and assume ownership, either
free of charge or at a subsidized price.1 1 5 For instance, in the
South Bronx,
[p]oor people in need of decent housing. . . banded together in
1977 and stopped the city from demolishing three empty tene-
ments in the 900 block of Kelly Street. After working all day
driving taxis or operating machines, they worked an additional
eight hours in shoulder-high debris, restoring the abandoned
shells that landlords had left to rot and burn. The apartments
finally sold for $250 to those who had invested at least 600
hours of labor. . . . Today the [Banana Kelly Community Im-
provement Association] has a staff of 90 that manages 415
apartments, plus a $22 million budget that includes funds to
renovate an additional 333 units. 16
112. See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 242 n.19. For a brief discus-
sion of the negative income tax, see P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS
471-473 (13th ed. 1989).
113. J. HEILBRUN, supra note 38, at 353.
114. See id. at 352-353; supra note 23. Congress apparently is reacting favorably to
various innovative proposals to increase the availability of affordable, habitable housing.
See Roberts & Shapiro, Can Jack Kemp Clean Up the HUD Mess?, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., July 3, 1989, at 26-27.
115. See Celis, supra note 103, at 21, col. 2 (ownership of city-owned homes as-
sumed by tenants and liability for improvement loans forgiven after five years of resi-
dence); Shapiro, supra note 23, at 20, 23 (District of Columbia program allowing public
housing tenants to purchase housing units at a discount and manage their housing
complexes).
116. Graham & Boyce, Out of the Ashes: A South Bronx Street Rises Through the
Toil of Poor Homesteaders, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1989, at AI, col. 1. This renaissance has
not been without consequent difficulties. With revival of the area have come higher rents.
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In Washington, D.C., "residents of the Kenilworth-Parkside hous-
ing project. . . have turned a once squalid housing project into an
oasis of safe, well-kept, two-story brick buildings. . . . Residents
were trained in home repairs and put on rounds to clean up trash
and fix up the grounds.111  The residents of Kenilworth-Parkside
were the first "public-housing tenants [in the nation] to purchase
their units at a discounted price."'118 This project, managed and
owned by the tenants, operates a day-care center, an addiction
treatment center, a beauty shop, a moving company, and a food
co-op, employing about eighty of the project's residents." 9
CONCLUSION
In sum, the excess supply of rental housing typically found at
the low-income end of the market, and the concomitant low qual-
ity and deterioration, can be remedied better by increasing the
effective demand for habitable housing by low-income persons
than by implying a warranty of habitability. This increase in ef-
fective demand may be most efficiently and equitably accom-
plished through residential rehabilitation and ownership programs
and through housing subsidiaries paid directly to tenants. An im-
plied warranty of habitability, on the other hand, may actually
reduce the supply of low-income housing by forcing some units out
of the market. These forms of incomes policy would do much to
"Part of the neighborhood . . . has ... been designated a historic landmark district,
where apartments rent for up to $700 a month and stately brownstones have sold for nearly
$200,000." Id. There is concern "that the area's new commercial potential may lead to the
sort of gentrification that could force the old-time residents out." Id. at A6, col. 5. "The
success of groups like Banana Kelly has shown city planners what potential lies in the vast
wasteland just north of Manhattan." Id. at Al, col. 1.
The homesteaders are protective of the improvements they have effected and "are torn
between extending a helping hand and pulling up the ladder before their rebuilt neighbor-
hood is swamped by new waves of the desperately poor." Id. "[R]esentment simmers over
the city's plan to cluster in the South Bronx nearly 70% of the homeless families it is
resettling - a policy that some term 'the laundering of Manhattan.'" Id. at A6, col. 4.
Although it is highly unlikely that city officials would agree to the following proposal, one
possible way to limit the influx of undesirable high-income residents (and, for that matter,
undesirable low-income residents) would be to allow abandoned buildings to be owned only
by those persons willing to individually invest at least 600 of their own labor hours to
rehabilitate them, just as the original Kelly Street rehabilitators did.
117. Shapiro, supra note 23, at 23.
118. Id. However, there is some concern that the success of Kenilworth-Parkside
may be expensive to reproduce. "'If everybody gets as much money as Kenilworth-Park-
side, they would all be happy', says Roberta Youmans of the National Housing Law Pro-
ject. 'But the money isn't there.'" Id.
119. Id.
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ensure the provision of habitable housing, even in the absence of
an implied warranty of habitability.
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